Reward as the Foundation of Ethics: A New Model for Understanding Human Motivation and Conflict Resolution

This essay presents a new ethical model based on the concept of reward as the fundamental principle of human motivation and moral action. Integrating insights from neuroscience, psychology, and philosophy, Leandro Castelluccio argues that high reward states—such as self-esteem, happiness, and inner coherence—constitute the ultimate criterion for guiding ethical decisions and social organization. This “ethics of reward” offers an alternative to both moral relativism and authoritarianism, proposing a naturalistic, rational, and empirically grounded framework for understanding human flourishing and conflict resolution in freedom. Continue reading Reward as the Foundation of Ethics: A New Model for Understanding Human Motivation and Conflict Resolution

Ciencia/Science

Explaining Qualia: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

This article proposes an innovative theoretical framework to address the hard problem of consciousness, focusing on the subjective nature of qualia. Drawing from interdisciplinary perspectives in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, the model challenges reductionist explanations that attribute consciousness exclusively to brain activity. The concept of the brain’s “atomic nature” is introduced, emphasizing the importance of identity in subjective experience. Furthermore, it argues that consciousness possesses a non-material dimension, distinguishing it from artificial intelligence and highlighting its role in human cognition and emotion. Continue reading Explaining Qualia: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Conciencia/Consciousness

In Defense of Free Will: How Modern Materialism and Determinism Are Mistaken

The debate on free will has been shaken by the rise of materialist determinism, driven by neuroscience and physics. Authors like Sam Harris argue that our decisions are mere products of neural processes and external factors, stripping consciousness of its autonomy. However, this essay challenges that perspective, exploring arguments in defense of a radical form of free will that might withstand deterministic objections. Is our will an illusion, or is there still room for true human agency? Continue reading In Defense of Free Will: How Modern Materialism and Determinism Are Mistaken

Filosofía/Philosophy

After the limits of capacity, what do we have left?

The essay reflects on the relationship between the complexity of human actions and self-esteem, arguing that the latter is cultivated through what we can do and our ability to scale complexity. It explores questions about the purpose of life and the problem of reaching the limits of our capabilities. The role of reward and creativity in human existence is analyzed, as well as the possibility that the nature of the universe may lead to an exhaustion of possibilities. Finally, it argues that self-esteem does not require eternity but rather the ability to create and experience new forms of reward. Continue reading After the limits of capacity, what do we have left?

Conciencia/Consciousness

If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

The essay explores the nature of subjective experience (qualia) and its relationship with brain activity. It addresses Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness and argues that, although subjective experience is a product of neuronal activity, it is not equivalent to it. The “atomic notion of the brain” is discussed, suggesting that neural patterns activate others without “perceiving” them, implying that the brain does not directly experience qualia. Finally, it analyzes how reflection on subjective experience can be explained without requiring a direct identity between consciousness and neural activity. Continue reading If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

Conciencia/Consciousness

Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

he essay critiques Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as an explanation for subjective consciousness, arguing that mere integration of neural activity does not account for qualia. Using the analogy of a camera’s photodiodes, it highlights that integration alone does not create subjective experience. The brain, like a network of independent yet interconnected neurons, lacks a unified perception of qualia merely through integration. Instead, consciousness arises from identity—a unitary sense of self that aligns with neural patterns but is not reducible to them. The discussion touches on the implications for thought experiments like Mary’s room, suggesting that while neural activity can explain behavior and cognition, qualia remain irrelevant to brain function and may not be necessary for explaining consciousness itself. Continue reading Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

Filosofía/Philosophy

On determinism and free will – Some reflections

This essay explores the nature of voluntary and involuntary actions, with an emphasis on decision-making within the volitional process. It examines the neuroscientific foundations of free will and the influence of unconscious processes on decision-making. Through the analysis of theories and experiments such as those of Libet, it questions whether conscious will is truly autonomous or determined by prior causes. Additionally, it reviews the philosophical and scientific implications of materialist monism versus dualist conceptions of the mind. Continue reading On determinism and free will – Some reflections