Neuroscience and optical illusions

The essay explores the visual system within Neuroscience and Cognitive Sciences, analyzing its complexity and relevance for understanding the brain. It describes the neuronal processes involved in visual perception, from the retina to the cerebral cortex, highlighting the functions of photoreceptors, the dorsal and ventral pathways, and specialized cells in visual processing. Additionally, it examines optical illusions and their implications for interpreting sensory stimuli, addressing the debate on whether the brain actively predicts or passively responds to visual information. Continue reading Neuroscience and optical illusions

Conciencia/Consciousness

Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

he essay critiques Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as an explanation for subjective consciousness, arguing that mere integration of neural activity does not account for qualia. Using the analogy of a camera’s photodiodes, it highlights that integration alone does not create subjective experience. The brain, like a network of independent yet interconnected neurons, lacks a unified perception of qualia merely through integration. Instead, consciousness arises from identity—a unitary sense of self that aligns with neural patterns but is not reducible to them. The discussion touches on the implications for thought experiments like Mary’s room, suggesting that while neural activity can explain behavior and cognition, qualia remain irrelevant to brain function and may not be necessary for explaining consciousness itself. Continue reading Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

Conciencia/Consciousness

Four short essays – 2 About the Quale

The essay delves into the nature of qualia (subjective experiences) and their structural variations. It explores how the intensity or clarity of a quale, such as the perception of a red color, is tied to structural changes within a unified segment of consciousness. These variations manifest as differences in intensity but remain bound to the same foundational quale. The text highlights that understanding qualia requires considering their associations with others, as a quale in isolation does not express characteristics. Additionally, it discusses the limitations of language in describing the intrinsic nature of a single quale and emphasizes the role of memory in recognizing qualia rather than in their manifestation. Continue reading Four short essays – 2 About the Quale

Conciencia/Consciousness

Applying Bayes’ concepts to the understanding of consciousness – Some errors

The essay critiques the application of Bayesian concepts to understanding consciousness, particularly in the field of neuroscience. It examines how visual illusions, such as the hollow-face illusion, are often interpreted as evidence that conscious perception is a Bayesian brain process predicting what it “should” see. The essay questions this interpretation, highlighting the lack of comparable illusions in other sensory modalities like touch or smell, and arguing that such phenomena might instead reflect perceptual mechanisms unrelated to prediction. The discussion emphasizes the need for caution in extending Bayesian frameworks to consciousness without robust evidence and explores alternative explanations, such as pattern activation, that may better account for these illusions. Continue reading Applying Bayes’ concepts to the understanding of consciousness – Some errors