If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

The essay explores the nature of subjective experience (qualia) and its relationship with brain activity. It addresses Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness and argues that, although subjective experience is a product of neuronal activity, it is not equivalent to it. The “atomic notion of the brain” is discussed, suggesting that neural patterns activate others without “perceiving” them, implying that the brain does not directly experience qualia. Finally, it analyzes how reflection on subjective experience can be explained without requiring a direct identity between consciousness and neural activity. Continue reading If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

Conciencia/Consciousness

Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

he essay critiques Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as an explanation for subjective consciousness, arguing that mere integration of neural activity does not account for qualia. Using the analogy of a camera’s photodiodes, it highlights that integration alone does not create subjective experience. The brain, like a network of independent yet interconnected neurons, lacks a unified perception of qualia merely through integration. Instead, consciousness arises from identity—a unitary sense of self that aligns with neural patterns but is not reducible to them. The discussion touches on the implications for thought experiments like Mary’s room, suggesting that while neural activity can explain behavior and cognition, qualia remain irrelevant to brain function and may not be necessary for explaining consciousness itself. Continue reading Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary