Preserving Personhood and Identity: Navigating the Buddhist Implications of the “No-Self” and Circumnavigating Confusions Regarding Our Ego

Preserving Personhood and Identity: Navigating the Buddhist Implications of the “No-Self” and Circumnavigating Confusions Regarding Our Ego

This essay explores the relationship between the Buddhist concept of “no-self” and personal identity, arguing that while the teaching of anatta can be liberating, it can also create confusion and adverse effects if misinterpreted. The discussion delves into how mindfulness practice, particularly the Dzogchen approach, can lead to depersonalization if misunderstood. Drawing from philosophers and neuroscientists like Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Thomas Metzinger, and Antonio Damasio, the argument supports the existence of personhood and identity as a functional construct based on self-awareness. The conclusion emphasizes that rather than negating identity, meditative practice can be a powerful tool to explore and understand the nature of consciousness without falling into nihilism. Continue reading Preserving Personhood and Identity: Navigating the Buddhist Implications of the “No-Self” and Circumnavigating Confusions Regarding Our Ego

Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary

he essay critiques Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as an explanation for subjective consciousness, arguing that mere integration of neural activity does not account for qualia. Using the analogy of a camera’s photodiodes, it highlights that integration alone does not create subjective experience. The brain, like a network of independent yet interconnected neurons, lacks a unified perception of qualia merely through integration. Instead, consciousness arises from identity—a unitary sense of self that aligns with neural patterns but is not reducible to them. The discussion touches on the implications for thought experiments like Mary’s room, suggesting that while neural activity can explain behavior and cognition, qualia remain irrelevant to brain function and may not be necessary for explaining consciousness itself. Continue reading Consciousness is not integrated information – A brief summary