Explaining Qualia: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

This article proposes an innovative theoretical framework to address the hard problem of consciousness, focusing on the subjective nature of qualia. Drawing from interdisciplinary perspectives in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, the model challenges reductionist explanations that attribute consciousness exclusively to brain activity. The concept of the brain’s “atomic nature” is introduced, emphasizing the importance of identity in subjective experience. Furthermore, it argues that consciousness possesses a non-material dimension, distinguishing it from artificial intelligence and highlighting its role in human cognition and emotion. Continue reading Explaining Qualia: A Proposed Theoretical Framework for Addressing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Conciencia/Consciousness

If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

The essay explores the nature of subjective experience (qualia) and its relationship with brain activity. It addresses Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness and argues that, although subjective experience is a product of neuronal activity, it is not equivalent to it. The “atomic notion of the brain” is discussed, suggesting that neural patterns activate others without “perceiving” them, implying that the brain does not directly experience qualia. Finally, it analyzes how reflection on subjective experience can be explained without requiring a direct identity between consciousness and neural activity. Continue reading If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?