In Defense of Free Will: How Modern Materialism and Determinism Are Mistaken

The debate on free will has been shaken by the rise of materialist determinism, driven by neuroscience and physics. Authors like Sam Harris argue that our decisions are mere products of neural processes and external factors, stripping consciousness of its autonomy. However, this essay challenges that perspective, exploring arguments in defense of a radical form of free will that might withstand deterministic objections. Is our will an illusion, or is there still room for true human agency? Continue reading In Defense of Free Will: How Modern Materialism and Determinism Are Mistaken

Conciencia/Consciousness

If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

The essay explores the nature of subjective experience (qualia) and its relationship with brain activity. It addresses Chalmers’ hard problem of consciousness and argues that, although subjective experience is a product of neuronal activity, it is not equivalent to it. The “atomic notion of the brain” is discussed, suggesting that neural patterns activate others without “perceiving” them, implying that the brain does not directly experience qualia. Finally, it analyzes how reflection on subjective experience can be explained without requiring a direct identity between consciousness and neural activity. Continue reading If conscious experience is not brain activity, how is it that the brain thinks of the color red?

Conciencia/Consciousness

Four short essays – 2 About the Quale

The essay delves into the nature of qualia (subjective experiences) and their structural variations. It explores how the intensity or clarity of a quale, such as the perception of a red color, is tied to structural changes within a unified segment of consciousness. These variations manifest as differences in intensity but remain bound to the same foundational quale. The text highlights that understanding qualia requires considering their associations with others, as a quale in isolation does not express characteristics. Additionally, it discusses the limitations of language in describing the intrinsic nature of a single quale and emphasizes the role of memory in recognizing qualia rather than in their manifestation. Continue reading Four short essays – 2 About the Quale

Conciencia/Consciousness

Does consciousness have a purpose?

The essay examines the question of whether consciousness has a biological or adaptive purpose, a topic central to the debate on the nature of consciousness. While many scholars argue that consciousness plays a vital role in cognitive functions such as planning, executive control, and social cognition, others propose it might be a by-product of other processes. The essay explores various theories, including the adaptive advantages of consciousness for future planning and decision-making, as well as the concept of qualia. It also raises the challenge of defining consciousness and whether it serves an essential function or is merely a secondary phenomenon. The discussion highlights ongoing research and contradictions in the field, questioning the evolutionary necessity of consciousness. Continue reading Does consciousness have a purpose?

Conciencia/Consciousness

Applying Bayes’ concepts to the understanding of consciousness – Some errors

The essay critiques the application of Bayesian concepts to understanding consciousness, particularly in the field of neuroscience. It examines how visual illusions, such as the hollow-face illusion, are often interpreted as evidence that conscious perception is a Bayesian brain process predicting what it “should” see. The essay questions this interpretation, highlighting the lack of comparable illusions in other sensory modalities like touch or smell, and arguing that such phenomena might instead reflect perceptual mechanisms unrelated to prediction. The discussion emphasizes the need for caution in extending Bayesian frameworks to consciousness without robust evidence and explores alternative explanations, such as pattern activation, that may better account for these illusions. Continue reading Applying Bayes’ concepts to the understanding of consciousness – Some errors